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Ann M. Ciasullo, Christine R. Metzo, and Jeffery L. Nicholas 
Iden~ity: Cultural knowledge-
self-knowledge 
disClosure interviews Linda Alcoff 
Linda Alcoff, Associate Professor of Philosophy and the Laura J. 
and L. Douglas Meredith Professor for Teaching Excellence at Syracuse 
University, visited the University of Kentucky in March 1997 as part of 
the Spring lecture series sponsored by the Committee on Social Theory. 
In a talk entitled "What Should White People Do?" she explored the 
costs of acknowledging white privilege. In response to the psychologi-
cal threats white people feel from this acknowledgment, there is a back-
lash. Dr. Akoff posed and attempted to answer the question of how to 
avoid this white backlash. She suggests the recreation of racial identity 
is needed and begins to explore exactly how this could be done through 
the recognition of our location in a community. 
Dr. Alcoff is the author of Real Knowing, numerous articles on femi-
nist epistemology and raced and gendered identities, co-editor of Femi-
nist Epistemologies, and co-editor (with Robyn Wiegman) of Who Can 
Speak?, a book on the problems of claiming identity. She is currently 
working on a collection of essays on race and personal identity entitled 
Visible Identities. 
In the following interview, the disClosure collective probes the 
metaphysical and epistemological beliefs which inform Alcoff's work 
on identity, especially racialized identities. Alcoff makes a place for 
herself in the debates surrounding race and identity by drawing on tra-
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ditions in Western philosophy coming out of Hegel and Marx, the cri-
tique of that tradition by the Frankfurt School thinkers and 
postmodernist thinkers (especially Foucault), epistemological thought 
of Hilary Putnam and others, and her own experience of mixed race ori-
gins. She discusses the importance of community and recognition for 
the restructuring of dialogues on race, the need to maintain affirmative 
action programs, and the complexity of our racial identification sys-
tems, especially with regard to the visible markers which denote racial 
identities. 
disClosure: Yesterday at your talk you discussed how individuals need 
some kind of group identity to achieve a personal identity. That seems 
somewhat communitarian, but communitarian politics are generally 
considered conservative. What do you think the relationship is between 
communitarian politics and your goals for group and personal iden-
tity? By communitarian we mean people like Alasdaire Macintyre, 
Michael Sandel, and Charles Taylor (although Taylor is not conserva-
tive). The conservative classification is derived from Macintyre. The 
idea is that if you want to give some prominence to the community, 
then the community outweighs the individual, and liberalism, accord-
ing to John Rawls, is based on the inviolability of the individual over 
society. 
Linda Alcoff: But the individual is constituted by the society, so it 
seems to me that Rawls' view rests on a metaphysical error. I think 
Macintyre was right; I think where I differ with Macintyre, for example 
in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, is on the notion that Christianity is 
the privileged discourse. But his ties to Christianity don't seem to me to 
be entailed by his account of tradition, the importance of tradition and 
community and history, and the relationship between reason and his-
tory. So I think you really can't ask the question of whether we should 
pay attention to personal, individual identity or group identity because 
they're mutually constituted. So, it's incoherent to start the question in 
that way. 
The question has to be, what kind of social discourse in community 
and institutions and the public arena do we want to create (to the extent 
we can create one) that will constitute individuals in the best way, the 
most egalitarian, the most liberating way possible, that will constitute 
individuals as having the capacity for the most democratic participa-
tion in the society and the public discourse. And I think that to do that, 
to engender the ability for an individual to participate in a moral 
project, does require a connection to a past and a present community. 
Individuals don't survive their own lives, but communities do last be-
yond the individual; so if you feel connected to a community you will 
have an investment in the future, whereas the liberal market society ab-
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stracts everything to the narrow individual concerns. This is meta-
physically wrong, and also then you don't have any concern about the 
seven generations beyond, as they say you should be concerned about. 
I'm thinki~g about ~nvironmental issues-why should you have an in-
vest~ent in the environment? If I don't have any connection to a com-
munity, to a race or an ethnicity or a nation or culture, I'll just try to 
make a lot of money and buy a lot of things. 
dC: Do you think that your position on this question, that there is a con-
nection between the individual and the community, and that they're 
bot~ mutually constituting, is something that develops out of your pe-
cuhar background as partly Latino? Might there then be a larger sense 
of community in a typical Latina family than, say, in a Midwestern 
American family? 
LA: That's an interesting question. I would say there are two things: 
one is the theoretical tradition that I work out of, of Hegel and Marx. 
Indiv~du~l~ engage in praxis, praxis constructs society, society consti-
tutes i~d1vidual, and that I have found theoretically compelling since I 
was eighteen. But, secondly, probably I think those of us who are 
marked in various ways-racially and by gender as well-notice the 
ways in which these group identity configurations affect issues of dis-
tribution of epistemic authority and credibility. Notions about how ra-
~ionality is co~ected to identity are at work in discourses and practices 
ma way that is embedded and implicit and invisible to others. Not that 
e~ery person ~f color has that knowledge and perspective, but it pro-
vides an experience that can be tapped into when other occasions-like 
theory, which is only one of them-make it possible to tap into that. 
d~: This sounds like a very theory-based academic project, and one of 
thmgs we were wondering in reading your essays is how do you sug-
gest we begin extending this dialogue to the greater community, the 
non-academic community? 
LA: Well, we have limited power and limited control. The market 
forces are on the upsurge; we're at a period of retreat, I think-with the 
attacks on multiculturalism and political correctness. There were a 
number of sixties intellectuals who went into the universities and pro-
duced social criticism. The result of that was this very well-orchestrated 
but widely dispersed attack on social criticism, and the social recon-
struction projects coming out of the academy push us back. So we're in 
a period of retreat. But clearly the dialogue is already being extended 
outside the academic community. Race is getting talked about all over 
the place, on NPR, MacNeil/Lehrer, Charlie Rose; Cornell West is on 
~he TV every other week, the Rodney King incident, also the uprisings 
t~ St. Petersburg, Florida-things that continue to happen. I think that 
given the disparities of wealth in this country and the way that these 
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disparities are grouped around race, there are going to continue to be 
uprisings and rebellions. That to me is inevitable and will increase with 
the reductions of welfare. Given that, there will be some public dis-
course trying to make sense of these events and give meaning and inter-
pretation, and I have been impressed with how the public arenas have 
made more of an effort to include African-American cultural theorists. I 
get frustrated because it's still black and white. The L.A. rebellions 
were so mischaracterized, as if it were simply black and white, when 
the majority of people who were arrested were Latinos, and there were 
a number of Asians involved in a different way. That discussion didn't 
get into the national arena. So it's already happening to a large extent, 
and what we can do is develop courses. I developed a course on race 
and identity-my colleagues looked a little bit askance-what does this 
have to do with philosophy?-but there is philosophical work now on 
race. So I developed this course. and I want to make it a regular part of 
the curriculum. Most of my students will not stay in the academy-we 
have a lot of journalism students at Syracuse University, so my hope is 
that these ideas will percolate in the rest of the society. 
dC: In terms of courses, how would you suggest incorporating into 
lower level courses some of the ideas in this course that you've devel-
oped? For example, I'm teaching Introduction to Ethics this semester, 
and we did a section on affirmative action. My students just didn't 
think there was a racism problem any more. I mentioned Texaco, "well 
that's just an anomaly." So how can we do some consciousness-raising 
at that level?' 
LA: You have to give them statistics. I give sheets of statistics, and they 
say, "Where'd you get these statistics?" and I say, "The US Govern-
ment," and they still say-they're so sophisticated now-"oh, well, you 
can produce statistics to show anything." But you have to make the ef-
fort, and it does open their eyes to the fact that some of the economic 
disparities between blacks and whites are getting worse. If you scour 
around, there are some fairly accessible essays that can be used in class 
as well. The students are often initially resistant, but I think the way 
pedagogy works is that you say something to them that they're unfa-
miliar with or hostile to, and immediately defense mechanisms come 
up and they resist. But a week later, a month later, you find out that you 
did have an effect; so you can't take that initial total rejection as neces-
sarily the end point of your effect as a teacher. Thankfully. 
dC: A moment ago you were talking about the L.A. riots and how they 
were misrepresented in the media as a black/white issue. We were 
wondering how we can bring to the public dialogue the realization, the 
understanding that race is not just a black/white issue, that there's 
much more to race. It's certainly not going to be easy, but what would 
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you suggest outside of teaching students who go to college and take 
courses? 
LA: _wen, we have to use every arena available; that's why I think the 
curriculum reforms that have been targeting public schools are so im-
portant. The~e was a very good one in New York state that I was very 
impressed with, that my kids have been through, but that has been un-· 
der attack.. Peop.le who decide to teach high school are heroes in my 
book. Not JU~t high .sc~ool, but elementary and junior high school. We 
need to use JOUrnahshc forums also-I think that as academics this is 
our site; I d~s~gree .with those who say it's the central site of political 
change, but it is an important site. And I think we would do best to use 
our own particular skills and proclivities-we need to write books 
need to write essays, and in our courses we need to use the books and 
essays that are being written. 
~C: So would you say that the role of the intellectual is basically con-
fined to t~e. academic setting, to the university? And this is in relation 
also to w~1hng books; most of the books, at least those that we philoso-
ph~~s wnte, .are unfortunately not for general use, right? We're not 
~ntlng Candide anymore. Do you think that we should change that, and 
if so, ~ow? And can we get respect from other philosophers if we do? 
LA: Right, we have limited power over how we can change it; Susan 
Bo~do and I talked about this all the time, because she really wanted to 
wnte more popular, accessible books, and so did I. Then, by the time 
you get through .tenure, ~11 these years of academic writing, you don't 
know how to wnte anything else! You can't write a good sentence any-
more! But clearly, there are people who are doing it; there are public in-
tellectuals.who have been talked about a lot-Henry Louis Gates writes 
regularly 1n the New Yorker; it's still an elite venue, but it's a wider 
venue. Noam Chomsky is another one. I did a five-day series of lectures 
for the Unitarian Universalists last summer on feminism-we need to 
take all those opportunities that we can to speak to larger groups. 
The other thing that, in terms of political strategy, is really key and 
w~at has not existed in this country that has existed in other coun-
tries-certainly in Latin America-is the possibilities of dialogue and 
teamwork between the labor movement and academics. The labor 
move.ment in this country represents several millions of people, mostly 
workmg class, increasingly large percentages of women and peoples of 
color; and the movement is really changing and has developed better 
leadership in creating a political agenda independent of the Democratic 
party. There was a big meeting in New York City in the fall called The 
Academy and The Labor Movement; AFL-CIO and other labor leaders 
c~i:ne, plus Robin Kelly and all these intellectuals came; it was very ex-
citing because they had this big auditorium, and two thousand more 
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people came than could fit in the auditoriu~, and they. ha~ t~ set up 
sound speakers outside on the sidewalk. So it see~s ~s if this ~s a mo-
ment in which that rapprochement could begin. S1m1lar meetings are 
being organized around the country. . . 
There are going to be political differences, there's gomg t.o be distrust. 
The labor movement has lots of bad history, and academics te~d to be 
elitist, so it's going to take work: but I'm very excited a~o~~ this devel-
opment, and I agree with the intelle.ctuals there who sa1~, we want to 
be a resource for this new progressive, labor movement, we wa~t you 
to tell us what kind of work will be helpful." And that's what I think we 
should be doing. Not to follow the party wher~ver it tells u~ to go, but 
to link up with this movement that is happenmg an~ ~hat is ~he most 
exciting thing happening in this country now. And its multicultural 
and multiracial and based in the working classes. 
race and identity 
dC: How is a positive construction of mixed-race identity goi~g t? be 
pertinent to what we've just been discussing, and do you do this with a 
further political goal in mind? Namely, is it a step towards some futt~re 
time when we can eradicate all racial divides altogether, or are racial 
categories still useful, and how long will they continue to be useful? 
LA: I don't know that we can see that far down the road as to whether 
racial identification will or should wither away. I think it's too early; I 
think that there's so much work still to be done to deepen people's un-
derstanding of how race affects thinking and experience and politics. 
dC: So, in other words, you advocate talking about race for our present 
cultural and societal situation? 
LA: I think we need to explore how so many of the neutra.l c~n~epts .and 
practices of community, of rationality, of liberty and of 1nd1~1duahs~, 
might be subtly encoded with racial practices. Like commumty and ~n­
dividual and liberty, what is taken as absolutely reasonable and r~t~o­
nal in white communities is just not the practice in many communities 
of color, and then they get classified as irrational. Like some of ~he stud-
ies I've seen about how, say, Latinos will give their whole savmgs to a 
relative who needs it, even when that relative isn't a good risk, shall we 
say. And it's like, from the mainstream perspective, this is irrational be-
havior, why would you do this? But there's a different sense of t~ese 
basic notions of what you do and who you are, and what your obliga-
tions are. And I think those things are deeply embedded in and are 
thought of as neutral political discourse. We need to have a long period 
of self-reflection and investigation of the ways in which race, among 
other things, permeates us and our institutions in so many ways. The 
positive reconstruction of mixed race identity is certainly important for 
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those of us who experience this problem, you know, the "tragic mu-
latto." And I do believe that arguing against purity could have larger 
implication because it's connected to authenticity and the notions of 
borders and boundaries and so forth. I'm not saying we have to get rid 
of racial identifications but of purist ones. 
dC: Do you think then that acknowledging some of these categories is a 
means through which we can· redefine notions of community or iden-
tity? 
LA: Yes and I certainly would want to say the racial categories need to 
be reconceived. The current concepts need to be problematized to see 
that we're all fluid and hybrid in all kinds of ways and mutually inter-
polated and constituted. So I don't think acknowledging the impor-
tance of racial categories means "white people can only talk about 
white things" or something like that, but it will show the ways in which 
categories do figure into identity. 
dC: In a related question then, what do you think of affirmative action 
programs? 
LA: Well I think they're vitally important, and they have been terribly 
misrepresented. I think they were misrepresented as nonuniversalist 
because of the claim that they're extending a privilege to one sector of 
the population over and above other sectors of the population. Actu-
ally, what they're trying to do is to equalize-so critics assume that be-
fore affirmative action we were starting from a level playing field, and 
then what affirmative action does is it takes people of color or women 
and it puts them at an overlook and gives them an advantage. But of 
course we were initially starting from a non-level playing field, and af-
firmative action is actually trying to equalize, and thus, in a sense, uni-
versalize the starting point for all people. This explanation doesn't get 
taken up by the media very much though. 
dC: (Ann) Or in the classroom I think. Like Jeffery, I taught affirmative 
action too, and students have really set ideas that it is wrong and it's 
bad- exactly what you said: it goes against everything that our country 
stands for-very strong beliefs about it. 
(Christine) Reverse discrimintion. 
(Jeffery) What was interesting in my class is that I had two African-
American students who were both against affirmative action. One of 
them did a presentation, and she said that she would rather be hired for 
her qualifications than for being black. And I said, how often are we 
hired for our qualifications? And they seemed to think that we're hired 
for our qualifications all the time. 
LA: Yeah, I've struggled with this one personally. I didn' t get my job 
initially because of affirmative action, although I think gender might 
have come into it. On another occasion I was given this award and 
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somebody said I received it because of affirmative action, and I just felt 
like, oh, god, this is so awful. So I know that it can have that effect. But 
I'd say two things: some people argue that we shouldn't support it be-
cause it won't reduce white racism; white people will just see every per-
son of color in the workplace as only there because of affirmative ac-
tion. But I think that's a mistake in argument to blame affirmative 
action for that; really, the problem there is the white racist interpreta-
tion of the situation as meaning that the person wasn't qualified. Affir-
mative action isn't foolproof immediately, but I believe in the idea of 
integration-you see people living with you or going to school with 
you or working with you and your racist assumptions break down. 
And the other thing I'd say is that I've talked with friends of mine who 
also have had affirmative action involved in attaining their jobs, and 
it's a personal, psychologically hard thing to think about and deal with. 
But a really good friend of mine who got a good job through a special 
hiring told me that his view is that it gave him the opportunity to get 
his foot in the door so that he could do his work. And he's doing really 
incredibly important work on race and philosophy. So he helped me to 
accept it as an opportunity to do the work that I believe is important. 
the critique of enlightenment 
dC: To shift gears slightly: a moment ago you said arguing against pu-
rity has all kinds of further implications, including how we talk about 
reason. We questioned whether the concept of reason, because it's 
white, is salvageable, and if so, how do we salvage the concept of rea-
son while arguing against purity at the same time? 
LA: I definitely think the concept of reason is salvageable. As for the 
Enlightenment-I think you have to have a two-sided analysis of the 
Enlightenment, which Adorno and Horkheimer had (particularly the 
introduction to Dialectic of Enlightenment). And Foucault also has this 
in his essay "What is Enlightenment?" in which he defends the project 
of increasing self-reflectiveness. So there are ways in which these more 
radical, deep projects which critique reason are also continuous with it. 
Now, the thing about reason is that the ways in which it is normally 
understood today in philosophy and elsewhere-it's not so much that 
the current understanding is entirely wrong and useless. Rather, it 
needs to be located and specified, which is what Adorno and 
Horkheimer do, and which is what Habermas does. I know there are 
problems with Habermas, but I think that something very useful about 
Habermas, especially in the context of philosophical discussions, is his 
notion that there are different kinds of rationalities. The mistake has 
been to collapse all of them into this one based on prediction, control, 
and abstract reasoning, and to see that as the only form of reason. Such 
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a collapse has all kinds of deleterious political effects. However, if we 
understand that abstract reasoning has limited utility, and is not the 
only form of reason, then it is not so pernicious. It would require giving 
up the universalist pretensions of that form of reason, and this would 
require a very different self-understanding of that form of reason. So to 
some extent it would shake the foundation for that notion of reason, but 
I think that the way to move forward, to salvage reason, is on the one 
hand to recognize that abstract form of reason as having limited utility 
and to talk about the multiple forms of reason as Habermas does. 
Habermas claims that there's a reason that's involved with the need for 
prediction and control, which we have the need for as human beings; 
there's a reason that's involved in communication; and there's a reason 
that's involved in liberation. And they have different methodologies. 
That's one way to salvage reason. 
The other way that's very important is to repair the split between 
reason and its others that was made in ancient Greece on the basis of 
the rejection of rhetoric and sophistry, and in philosophy this split, at 
least when I was in grad school, was the reigning dogma. According to 
this dogma, all of the rhetorical elements of the text, and the desire and 
power that are in the text, are left outside of the analysis, and we reduce 
the text to its referential content, and we set up oppositions, and we as-
sess their logical relationships and that's the entirety of the meaning of 
the text. But texts always have these other kinds of textual elements, 
and I think, like Michele LeDoeuff, that those other elements actually 
do philosophical work; they don't simply obscure meaning and throw 
up obfuscations. They're actually part of reason; they are part of ratio-
nality in the sense of judgment. We're very early in the stages of doing 
this reconceptualization of reason. There have been really good cri-
tiques of reason in this century, starting with Nietzsche who said that 
what's wrong with the dogma is that it takes as the essence of the real 
that which is an abstraction from the real. So you have this full-bodied, 
concrete lived experience or a full text, with rhetoric, desire and power 
all in it, and you abstract from that these propositions that then can be 
analytically taken apart-this is what logic does-and you then take 
that as the essential reality of the world, of the text, but it's not. It's an 
abstraction from the real. So there's a kind of lying going on, and 
Nietzsche said, of course, logic lies, and I agree. But it's not that logic's 
useless, right? It's that it is doing a certain kind of thing, a certain kind 
of task; but as philosophers, I think we need to develop ways to deal 
with texts in their fuller reality and to deal with arguments in their 
fuller reality as do Habermas, LeDoeuff, and feminist epistemologies. 
We need to borrow ideas from literary theory or from post-struc~ral­
ism on how to read the multiple layers of a text; we need to develop 
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ways to do normative critique, to do epistemic critique, but ones that 
will bring in all these multiple layers. 
dC: So you would say, then, that Foucault is trying to repair the split 
between reason and its other? 
LA: Yes, very much so. 
dC: And that Horkheimer and Adorno and Habermas are trying to rec-
ognize the limited utility of Enlightenment reason and that it's not the 
only form of reason? 
LA: I think Horkheimer and Adorno are mostly providing a critique. 
Horkheimer does some methodological reconstructive work, but 
mostly they're providing a critique of Enlightenment reason. Foucault 
is also offering a way to begin a fuller analysis of how reason actually 
operates in the world and history. And Habermas has also got this re-
constructive project. In actuality, there is no incommensurability be-
tween any of these forms of discourse or forms of reason, and 
Macintyre, among others, makes this argument. When you begin to talk 
about things like "white reason," it does sound as if you're going to 
lead to a situation in which we can't talk to each other. The reason why 
that's not the case is that in this increasingly global world, none of our 
worlds are incommensurable-even, I think, between historical peri-
ods. Incommensurability really means that there's no element in com-
mon. And if you have at least one element in common, then you can be-
gin to work from that to have dialogue. So I think this is a more 
accurate description of the situation that we're in. And that's why abso-
lute relativism is not really a danger. There's still the difficulty of adju-
dicating conflict between different positions, and it's a tremendous dif-
ficulty, but I think by problematizing the dominant Western conception 
of reason, we're going to have a better chance of doing that. Rather than 
saying that there is this one standard and you don't meet it, so there-
fore, I don't have to explore the coherence of your system and your 
thinking. 
dC: So, do you think the whole debate over incommensurability, which 
arose out of social science studies and anthropology, has been mis-
guided? 
LA: Yes, I wrote my master's thesis on Kuhn, and I think that the more 
historicist philosophies of science, Lakatos and others, are much better. 
Kuhn himself didn't really mean incommensurability and he tried to 
retract it. I think, though that part of what is motivating that claim is 
this other problem, namely how absolute relativism is detrimental to 
intersubjective relations-if you have an incommensurability situation, 
you have to have absolute relativism, because you don't have a clue 
about the validity of beliefs in other paradigms. Hilary Putnam makes 
the argument that that kind of position cannot lead to real respect for 
50 
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others. If ~ believe that you have a view that I can't possibly under-
stand, I will tolerate your views, but if I can't possibly understand you, 
then ~y toleran.ce for your views is based on a kind of Kantian duty-
followmg, dev01d of a.ffect. And it ce~tainly doesn't motivate me to try 
to u.nd~rstand your views. Whereas 1f you think that you and I share 
reahty in some way and also share some discursive traditions which I 
believe that of course we do, then you are motivated to try to
1 
make as 
much sense as you can of the other's position. And that is much better 
than this kind of empty, dutiful tolerance of the other. Following 
Wittgenstein actually in this argument, Putnam says that you can' t 
even see the other as a self or as a subject on such a view, because you 
can't really understand them as operating in the way that you yourself 
do. The ~eason I say that may be motivating the incommensurability ar-
gument is that when the West begins to realize its own Eurocentrism, 
and that maybe other cultures are not all inferior to us in reason, de-
mocracy and cultural values, it's actually an easier position to move to 
absolute relat~vism at that point, because then you can say, "okay, 
~aybe the universal teleology we accepted wasn't right (this is what 
Richard Rorty says) but we Europeans have our traditions, and we are 
within those traditions and we can't know the other traditions, but 
that's okay." Such a view doesn't require an engagement with the 
other, and I think that might be motivating some people who are at-
tracted to incommensurability. It's easier for European, Anglo dis-
courses to move to relativism than to follow the implications of the cri-
tique of Eurocentrism. 
dC: T~~ problem of incommensurability consists of how one rationality 
can ~~1hque another. Macintyre says in Whose Justice? that a particular 
~rad1t~on cannot critique itself from inside, so this leads to the question, 
if African American culture is different from white culture, how can the 
one understand the other? So your answer to that would be that be-
cause we share the same reality ... 
LA: Well, also, our traditions are enmeshed ... 
dC: .. .in the history itself ... 
LA: ... Yeah, part of what the Eurocentric discourses have done is to 
erase, of course, all the ways in which they have been affected by, influ-
enced by, other cultures and other ideas. I think obviously African-
American culture is a hybrid negotiation of different traditions. And 
Latin American as well. To say "share the same reality" sounds like 
~here's t~is uninterpreted reality out there, and I don't want to give that 
impression. We share the same reality in that we have to live together 
and we negotiate a practical environment. 
dC: Would you say that it is impossible for the two cultures not to un-
derstand each other because they are not created in a vacuum, they can-
51 
ciasullo, Metzo, & Nicholas 
t themselves from other cultures because those cultures not separa e 
h . t' ? have contributed tot etr crea ion. 'bl b t l 
LA: Right. Partial misunderstandings are of course poss1 e ut to a 
misunderstandings are not. 
cinema-scope 
dC: Have you seen the movie A Time To Kill? . . 2 
LA· Yes that movie is an interesting contrast with Dances With Wolves.£ 
It has the same subplot: white attempt to incorporate t~e les.s;nsb o t 
anti-racism. This white lawyer, Jake, wants to be on the nght s1 e, u 
he under oes some criticism when Carl Lee (the black defe.ndant) says 
" ou're t~e bad guy." So the movie is a process of Jak~ coming to .terms 
~th racism and with what it means for his own identity. But white su-
w~riorit is totally recuperated in the final scene in that Carl ~ee ~earns f J ~ Jake is vindicated in the end as the color-blind white liberal, 
s~o~a; h:·doesn't have to do the kind of soul-searching or s~lf-trans~o:­
mation that Kevin Costner does in Dances. In this sense A Time To. K1l.l 1s 
worse. Jake uses a universalist, color-~lind rhetoric at the begmn1ng 
and it's left intact at the end of the movie. . . 
dC· Carl Lee seems to be saying that there is a certam incommensura-
bility, for Jake keeps saying, "oh, we'r~ a ~reat.team," and Carl Lee says 
"no we're not." And in that movie their histo:i~s are enmesh~d. ms of 
LA· I didn't see it in terms of incommensurab1hty or not, but in ~er . 
uni~ersalism or group identity. And Carl Lee saying no, group i~enht~ 
is relevant here and the notion that we can transcend that to~ univ~rsa 
lane is not going to work. And Jake is pu.shing for .the univer~a ism~ 
~ou can reject that universalism without being com~1tted to an. incom _ 
mensurability. We are positioned differently, and different social loc~ 
tions have a tremendous effect in all kinds of ways, but we are posi-
tioned differently within this shared history I framework, so we also 
share a lot of traditions and parts of ourselves. . 
LA: Did you see The English Patient? It's a movie that takes as its theme 
national identities and national allegiances and suggests that these .ar~ 
essentially unreal and pernicious. The movie contrasts geographica 
landscapes-that are filmed so beautifully-and the l~ndsc~pe~ ?f th~ 
body showing their similarity: they are complex, unique, individ~a h 
only inadequately captured by names, borders, identitites. T~e Enghs 
patient, the hero, is set up as this romantic figure: a .Hunga~ian count, 
educated in England, member of the Royal Geogra~hical Societ~, ~om~~ 
one who respects no national allegiances b~t on his deathbed ~s ironi _ 
cally misidentified only as "English." So he is someone who resists bor 
ders, exploring caves and artifacts, learning a great deal about Arab 
culture, pursuing knowledge as if for its own sake. 
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dC: So he's the character of universalism? 
LA: He is seen in a way as universal, as exemplifying this border cross-
ing, but also, I think his role represents a certain variant of 
postmodernism. He symbolizes always an individual, a man who 
doesn't want to be named even, because of the way a name will locate 
and constrain him. His philosophy is to be simply an individual of the 
world, he doesn't believe in getting married, in possessing others, in 
putting boundaries around human relationships. And he conducts him-
self accordingly in the movie in both his private and public life, at one 
point allying with the Nazis, at another point with their enemies. Well, 
all of this falls apart and mayhem results, and we see that this attempt 
to escape identity tragically fails, but I think the audience is led 
throughout the movie to believe that his approach is right even if un-
workable, and that these national allegiances people feel are important 
are really not (as he says at one point, "You ally with the Nazis and they 
kill a thousand people; you ally against them and the other side kills a 
thousand people; in any case a thousand people will die"). What's so 
insidious about this movie is that we see the borders and boundaries of 
Egypt penetrated by these European archaeologists; we see the bound-
aries of women and their relationships penetrated and broken down, 
but the borders of "jolly old England" are never even shown, much less 
penetrated. So there is this Hungarian count, an aristocratic male, 
breaking down borders because they get in his way in the European 
quest for knowledge. So the borders of the Third World are in the way, 
the identity categories are in the way, and these get transgressed in the 
movie, while the borders of England and the borders and hierarchies of 
class and gender are left intact! 
positionality and personal identity 
dC: As a follow up to your discussion of The English Patient, you seem 
to be advocating a position in your work which sits somewhere be-
tween essentialism and universalism on the one hand and 
postmodernist relativism on the other. You seem not to want to advo-
cate either side of that divide, but rather you seem to occupy a space 
that is situated between them. Where do you see yourself in this debate 
and how do you avoid the pitfalls of essentialism and relativism? 
LA: I do want to avoid essentialism. I even want to avoid strategic es-
sentialism. I don't think that's a coherent position. I developed a con-
cept of positionality in a paper I wrote several years ago and which I 
am developing further in Visible Identities. There I was suggesting that 
we think about gender identity in terms of its position in a social space 
rather than any inherent characteristics so that you can think. about 
what it means to be a woman and what the meaning of woman is not in 
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terms of some internal, core attributes that all women share-which 
leads you into essentialism-but in terms of shared social location and 
structured space, thus it's positionality. In this way you can understand 
that your social status is based not on your internal attri~utes but o~ 
your relations in this social space. And 
1
so, .for exai:nple. :'h1te womens 
social status changes vis-a-vis who we re interacting with as we move 
through a social landscape; I was trying to develop this concept of 
positionality so that we can still talk about identity and the importance 
of social location but in a way that will not ultimately refer back to 
some essential core. 
dC: It also seems to avoid that free-flowing, relative identity of post-
structuralism. 
LA: Yes, there is a structured grid within which we're operating, which 
is open and fluid itself, and changing, but certainly not open to indi-
vidual, voluntaristic kinds of action 
dC: So the locations themselves change, but it's not like we can't ever 
grab onto one of them in order to meet as a group? 
LA: You know, I think we are (always already) located, and that can be 
the way to articulate a commonality between women rather than based 
on some internal core. That's what I was trying to move toward: that 
vis-a-vis men in every society we're positioned in some similar ways. 
We can avoid relativism by understanding the importance of social lo-
cation. So it isn't that we can grab onto locations, but that we are lo-
cated. We have agency in that there are different approaches we can 
take in response to that location, and there's a range of things that we 
can choose to do and moves that we can make. 
dC: Those moves are really important feminism, where the notion of 
"woman" itself has been challenged. Many feminist endeavors have 
been criticized by women of color and by lesbians for assuming that 
there is a universal subject or an essential woman; such criticisms have 
shown that this essential woman is not universal at all, but rather is 
aligned with white, middle-class, heterosexual ideas. 
LA: In "Cultural Feminism vs. Postmodernism: The Identity Crisis in 
Feminist Theory," Vm looking at cultural feminism, which is the essen-
tialism view, and postmodernism, which is what I called a nominalist 
account of identity in the philosophical sense, and which erases really 
important parts of identity. I try to work between those two positions. 
I think performative accounts of identity tend toward relativism, 
and toward a kind of idealist account that focuses too much at the level 
of cultural representation and discourse and away from bodies and ma-
terial reality. We need a more materialist, a more physical engagement 
with the flesh and body. Toward such an account, what can be very 
useful is Merleau-Ponty's work and phenomenology that is 
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reconfigured away from universalism. That's what I am trying to do in 
Visible Identities, to use a Merleau-Pontian approach to offer a phenom-
enology of the raced body and the gendered body. I think this moves 
away from the problem of voluntarism and relativism because we are 
located in these inscribed bodies. It is also related to reason in that rea-
son is related to the body, but what that means, of course, we are just 
beginning to flesh out. 
postmodernism andfeminism 
dC: Have you read Volatile Bodies? In it, Elizabeth Grosz uses Foucault, 
Deleuze and Guattari to develop a corporeal feminism. How do you 
think one could bring in postmodernism to make a more corporeal, ma-
terial philosophy? 
LA: Well, I think that book, more than Butler's work, has bodies in it. I 
think it's fascinating. Generally, though. I don't think we're going to get 
a corporeal or materialist account from postmodernism. I'm not as opti-
mistic about Deleuze and nomadic positionality as Liz is, for reasons 
that I gave in the critique of The English Patient. I think you get a postur-
ing of nomadism in The English Patient that collapses back to the privi-
leged European male identity formation. Although there are lots of in-
credibly important elements of Deleuze's work, on metaphysical 
questions in particular, mostly what we get from postmodernism is an 
internal critique within European-based discourses which has been 
prompted primarily by the Holocaust, as well as by the self-determina-
tion movements in the former colonies. Postmodernism is incredibly 
important and incredibly useful, but it is located as an internal Euro-
pean critique. I counsel a position with respect to postmodernism, 
rather than being the acolyte, because I think especially feminism has a 
tendency toward dutiful following. It takes so much work to master 
postmodernism that you could spend your whole career trying to make 
one little move in the language game. Rather, I think like Linda Singer 
does, for example, that our attitude as feminist theorists and post-colo-
nial theorists should be somewhat autonomous; we should use it when 
it's useful but not feel a need to be loyal. What often happens between 
feminism and postmodernism is that feminism gets interrogated by 
postmodernism. Postmodernism says to feminism," well you're essen-
tialists over here and you've got a teleology over here," and feminist 
theory is expected to scurry around and correct itself. But there has not 
been nearly as much of a feminist critique of postmodernism that's 
been taken up by postmodernists, so that Linda Singer says it's like the 
traditional marriage social contract where the wife has to be very faith-
ful, but the husband is not interrogated for his infidelity in th~ same 
way. 
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dC: Do you think that French feminists, such as Luce Irigaray in par-
ticular, have tried to provide a critique of postmodernism from within 
the tradition of postmodernism in France? 
LA: Yes, I think that she is doing critical work that is operating autono-
mously. Her feminist liberatory project is clearly uppermost, and she 
will use, for example, psychoanalysis to critique philosophy and phi-
losophy to critique psychoanalysis. But she is one of the only feminist 
philosophers who is developing theory herself. 
dC: How has postmodernism contributed to conversations about race? 
Do you think it has done more harm than good? 
LA: Well, where it has been good is at the level of analyzing cultural 
representation. In terms of cultural studies, there have been wonderful 
studies of cultural representations of others, constructions of others, 
raced others; for example, Robyn Wiegman's work American Anatomies 
is an incredible analysis. Postmodernism has contributed to an under-
standing of race in terms of analyzing popular cultural representations. 
I think in terms of theorizing race in relationship to the self, a project 
important for philosophy and political theory, there may not be a lot of 
help from postmodernism. Phenomenology might be more useful here. 
recognition and personal identity 
dC: If the recognition of self is necessary for a dialogue on issues of ra-
cial identity, what is the relationship between group identity, self-iden-
tification and the initiation of practical dialogue on questions of race? 
You have already addressed how group and self-identity are mutually 
constructed. How important is that recognition for a practical dialogue? 
LA: In Hegel, the goal of know ledge and the ultimate outcome of the 
development of the universal spirit is an absolute coming together of 
subject and object. There is no excess, there is no supplement, and thus 
many worry about a kind of totalizing in Hegel which makes him po-
litically problematic. But there is a lot of Hegel which is actually useful. 
Some people in post-structuralism do these vast critiques of Hegel and 
dismiss him, but I think that Hegel is right about recognition. And this 
is a struggle with my students as well; they think "well, if I think I'm a 
good person, then who cares what society thinks of me. I can just go on 
about my business." Hegel insists on the need for public recognition, 
and I think he's right. 
dC: But you cannot really recognize yourself without the recognition of 
the group? 
LA: I think we get our sense of self from how we are seen by the Other. 
Sartre is right. and he gets it from Hegel. I think as women we may in-
tuit this better because we experience such a disparate number of 
selves. In the classroom we are given authority and everyone writes 
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down what we say, but then in a bar or walking down a street, you're a 
cunt; you have this totally different sense of self. 
I find this analysis of recognition compelling, which gets us to vis-
ibility, and visibility gets us to gender and race and the ways in which 
we group ca.tegories of identity. A~d though the ways we group are not 
true fo~ all times and place~, certam ways are very powerful right now. 
So I thi~k that ~ckno.wledgmg the importance of group identity is nec-
ess.ary l~ prac~1cal dialogue. Iris Young has this kind of argument for 
affirmative action, for an epistemic credibility or epistemic inclusion in 
dialogic encounters in Justice and the Politics of Difference. She thinks that 
we need to build into the requirements of dialogue in a practical, politi-
cal .encounter, some recognition for these groups, group identities and 
their effects on reason and effects on judgment, and make sure that 
marginalized others are included and have a space in some kind of 
way. This is not to say that you don't criticize people who are different 
than you. If you don't ever criticize people who are different than you, 
you are not really respecting them as thinkers. So the point is not to in-
clude the voices, and then say yes to whatever they say. That attitude 
does~'t respect .them as t~inkers or their ability to engage with your 
own interpretation of reahty. From a position of inclusion, you have to 
then build in standards of quality and acknowledge that these can be 
a.ffected by deeply embedded group assumptions and cultural tradi-
tions. 
dC: You mention that recognition gets us to the visible and some would 
argue that emphasizing the visible, or looking to the visible to talk 
about race, reinforces and reifies race as visible, that one can look for 
m~rkers on the body. What would your response be to someone if they 
said, well, you can't talk about race and the visible? 
LA: Well, I think that the visible is operating whether we like it or not. I 
say in "Race and Philosophy" that there is this interplay of perceptual 
practices and bodily appearance. And there hasn't been very much 
philosophical attention to this. So paying attention to what is already 
operating between us is the first task that needs to be done. The worry 
about reinforcing race may disproportionately come from white people 
who don't want to see themselves as white because of all that it entails: 
it's seen as accusatory, or limiting, or you just don't want to have to 
deal .with that history. it's the same as "Well, I didn't own any slaves 
and it has nothing to do with me," right? So that is where some of the 
resistance to bringing in the visible originates, because we're all visible. 
Whiteness is as visible as blackness. 
To say that visibility is always involved isn't to say that there is one 
system of visibility, of the meanings of the visible or the meanings of 
the visible markers. There are often multiple systems operating even in 
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the same community, certainly between countries. So I am not bringing 
in the visible to argue that there is one perceptual system. . 
dC: In your essay "Mestizo Identity" you talk about how people thmk 
you are white, and then you say, "oh but I'm part Latino::' and the~ 
they say, "oh I guess I can see that you have this x, y, or z. And until 
you told them they had no connection to the v.isible markers that are 
not so obvious. It allowed them to read you. 
LA: Well I would say that part of the problem is that modes of perceiv-
ing identity are taught and are culturally specific but this is not a~­
knowledged much in the U.S. My point in the p~p~r. ':as. to say that this 
reaction of people is indicative of the fact that v1s1b1hty ts so important 
for race, because they feel like "oh, there's got to be some telltale per-
ceptible trace." The Nazis tried to come up ~ith me~surements of Jew-
ish facial structures, for example, as shown in the film Europa Europa, 
because there is intense anxiety about border control. It's tied into 
knowing who is, even knowing whether oneself is of a certain identity. 
We've got to have these markers. And this indicates how important the 
visible has been. 
dC: We have been talking about phenotype the whole time, but we're 
bothered by how, then, we make sense of classifica~ions of p~ople 
based on lifestyles, in terms of race. For example Afncan-Am:nc~ns 
call other African-Americans white because they have a certam hfe-
style, for example, they are Republicans. Or more importantly attitudes 
and beliefs. 
LA: I think in that example, when the charge is made, it doesn't say that 
your race has hanged but that your cultural affiliation has changed. The 
charge is arguing that your cultural affiliation is. not w~at ~t .should ?e 
given your racial identity. It is not going against t~1s v~s1b~e. racial 
economy; it agrees with it. But I absolutely agree that identity ts in fact 
very complex and all these categories are really inadequate to reality. 
But there is this tradition in Europe and in the United States of cluster-
ing all of these kinds of lifestyles and internal qualities, such as ch.a~ac­
ter, and language, to the visible. That there would be some v1s1ble 
marker, essentially race, and all these other things like culture and at-
tributes follow from it. 
endnotes 
1. Recall the CEO of Texaco who was fired and then turned tapes 
over to the authorities which were recordings of CEO meetings at 
Texaco which evidenced racist comments from the CEOs. This led to 
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charges and indictments against Texaco and its CEOs for discrimina-
tory practices. 
2. In her paper, "What Should White People Do?" presented at the 
University of Kentcuky's 9th annual speaker series sponsored by the 
Committee on Social Theory, Alcoff remarked on the transformation of 
the character played by Kevin Costner in Dances with Wolves. 
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